Much has already been said about the diversity of the Brazilian system, so I would like to focus my comment on your second recommendation regarding greater leniency towards individuals who self-manifest themselves. It seems that the authors of the Clean Company Act have large companies in mind when writing the law, perhaps in the act, that corrupt activities would be limited to a department of a company run by a small group of people who could be punished. In this scenario, company executives may be encouraged to self-report this behaviour and these corrupt individuals in the interest of the company as a whole. However, as you make clear, it works less well if corruption is more widespread and involves members of the company`s management. In this scenario, I think that reporting company members could be a more effective way to fight corruption. How does this law interact with Brazil`s whistleblower laws? Can a person who self-presents under the Clean Company Act be considered a signaller and thus be protected? Several authorities. The law gives jurisdiction to several Brazilian authorities to enforce its provisions. It also gives the “highest authority of any public body or body” the opportunity to enter into leniency agreements. This raises a variety of issues concerning corruption offences that affect several jurisdictions. Do companies have to enter into different leniency agreements for each jurisdiction? If a company reports to the Office of the Federal Comptroller General (CGU), will other jurisdictions respect the comparison? How do companies take the risk that one authority might decide to pay itself while another is not? The ACA sets out various principles to govern the collective efforts of agencies, defines the pillars of leniency communication under the Anti-Corruption Act, and requires its signatories to take certain concrete steps. Depending on the implementation of the ACA and how it will be implemented, it could change potentially dramatic aspects of Brazil`s anti-corruption framework. In April this year, the General General of the Union (CGU) and the Attorney General of the Union (AGU) – the two main federal agencies responsible for monitoring corruption with the Federal Prosecutor (MPF) – announced a new directive following a massive anti-corruption investigation.

This directive aims to make public the anti-corruption leniency agreements signed by these agencies in cooperation with companies. Cueva listed some of the challenges associated with consolidating leniency agreements in the country: one of the most innovative features of Brazil`s new anti-corruption law is Chapter 5, which defines the possibility of leniency agreements for companies. This is a new concept in Brazil`s anti-corruption arena. In the plain language of the law, the conclusion of such agreements and compliance with their conditions allow companies to reduce the fines in force by up to two thirds and exempt them from judicial and administrative sanctions.